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Drawing mostly on Chinese-language sources, this article examines Chinese assessments
of the effectiveness of China’s earlier “charm offensive” in increasing China’s regional
influence and reshaping the regional order according to its preferences. The main
argument is that China achieved mixed success. China was successful in preventing
others from adopting hostile anti-China balancing postures, and especially before 2005,
successful in attaining support and momentum for its preferred vision of East Asian
regional cooperation and regional trade liberalization. China was less successful,
however, in shaping the regional security order, although experts recognized the
incremental improvements in what would be a gradual process in minimizing the
dominance of U.S. alliances. Around 2005, however, Chinese experts noted increased
resistance to China’s preferred vision for regionalism and regional economic cooperation.
The article concludes by examining analytical themes that enabled China to successfully
exert regional influence or represented challenges to its efforts to reshape the region.
本文绝大部分取材于中文资源, 研究了中国对其早期 “魅力攻势” 的有效性的评价。此前,
中国采取魅力攻势以期提高区域影响力, 并依照其意愿重塑区域秩序。本文的主要论点则
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Introduction
After the Cold War, China tried to improve its relations with its neighbors,but its growing power and signs of aggressive behavior led to concerns in
the region in the mid-1990s that a rising China would threaten regional peace
and stability. Chinese leaders learned from the Cold War experience that hostile
neighbors and a complicated regional environment would make it difficult to
focus its efforts and resources on the huge tasks of sustaining economic growth
and maintaining domestic stability. In the mid-to-late 1990s, China imple-
mented a grand strategy of reassurance, or what others have called a “charm
offensive.” In an effort to address concerns about the “China threat,” China’s
reassurance included cooperating with major powers and regional powers to
demonstrate China’s benign intentions and to show that as China gets more
powerful it will not threaten the interests of these countries, but will use its
increased power to help protect those interests (Goldstein, 2005; Kurlantzick,
2007; State Council Information Office, 2005). Experts agree that China’s “charm
offensive” was on full display toward China’s neighbors and in China’s
“surrounding area” or “periphery” (zhoubian), where China’s proactive engage-
ment, restraint, and cooperation dramatically improved relations with its
neighbors (Shambaugh, 2004/2005; Zhao, 1999). China’s active participation in
regional institutions, restraint in the South China Sea, and economic and politi-
cal initiatives especially improved China’s relations with the countries in South-
east Asia (Ba, 2003; Glosny, 2006).
After the financial crisis broke out in 2008, many international experts
detected a shift in China’s strategic approach to its neighbors away from reas-
surance and toward assertiveness and coercion. China’s assertiveness, especial-
ly in maritime disputes with many of its neighbors, heightened tensions with
its neighbors and sacrificed most of the gains in improved relations during the
period of China’s “charm offensive” (Fravel, 2015; Glosserman, 2014). Chinese
officials and scholars have downplayed this notion of a dramatic shift in Chi-
na’s strategic approach. According to this view, China has continued to uphold
its “peaceful development” road, but in addition to continuing important
efforts to “maintain stability” (weiwen), China has also taken more active
responses when challenged by its neighbors as part of its simultaneous efforts
to “protect rights and interests” (weiquan), especially in its relations with its
neighbors (State Council Information Office, 2011, 2015; Zhang, 2015). Although
there has been greater increased focus on the degree and direction of recent
changes in Chinese grand strategy, this article will focus on using Chinese-
language sources to examine the degree to which China increased its regional
influence and reshaped the regional order during this earlier “charm offensive”
period.
During the second term of the Bush administration and before the onset of
the financial crisis, the dominant view among Asia analysts was that China’s
“charm offensive” was a great success in increasing its influence in the region.
According to one senior Singaporean diplomat in a 2004 interview, “The United
States may still dominate the [regional] balance of power, but not the balance of
influence” (cited in Shambaugh, 2004/2005, p. 66; for a similar quote from a
diplomat, Kang, 2007, p. 127). Several other experts heard similar sentiments
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from diplomats and experts in Asia and many analysts agreed with Ellen
Frost’s (2008, p. 245) claim that “China has clearly gained in the regional bal-
ance of influence” (Frost, Przystup, & Saunders, 2008; Keller & Rawski, 2007;
Kurlantzick, 2007). Major newspapers were also full of stories detailing Chinese
successful economic and political initiatives in the region, often juxtaposing
them with American and Japanese ineffectiveness and passivity (Marquand,
2003; Perlez, 2004).
The success of rising China’s “charm offensive” in Asia led Kang (2007, p. 55)
to conclude that “China is reshaping foreign relations in the region” and Sham-
baugh (2004/2005, p. 64) to suggest that this engagement is “reshaping the
regional order.” Given China’s massive scale and dramatic growth, China’s rise
and its foreign policy is unquestionably reshaping the region. However, this
article draws on the distinction in the social science literature between power as
capabilities and power as influence to re-examine China’s rising influence in
the region and reshaping of the international order (Baldwin, 2002; Dahl, 1957).
According to this distinction, power as influence (hereafter influence) only
exists if other actors alter their preferences or behavior or if the regional order
evolves in the direction that China prefers. Or more succinctly, China only has
influence if it gets its way and others defer to it. This article will examine how
effective China was at reshaping the regional order in ways consistent with its
preferences, as well as the issue areas in which China had more or less influ-
ence in shaping behavior, relations, agendas, and regional order. This approach
is consistent with and draws on other research that effectively uses this analyti-
cal approach to assess how China’s rise is affecting the world (Foot & Inboden,
2014; Goh 2014, 2016).
Drawing mostly on Chinese-language sources, this article examines Chinese
assessments of the effectiveness of the “charm offensive” in increasing China’s
regional influence and reshaping the regional order according to its preferen-
ces. Many other scholars have addressed this issue from a Western or regional
viewpoint, but the main contribution of this article is to thoroughly examine
the perceptions and assessments in Chinese language sources that have not yet
been examined in great detail in the English language body of scholarship. The
main argument is that China’s earlier efforts to reshape the regional order and
exert influence in East Asia achieved mixed success. China was particularly
successful in preventing others from adopting hostile anti-China balancing pos-
tures, and especially before 2005, successful in attaining support and momen-
tum for its preferred vision of East Asian regional cooperation and regional
trade liberalization. China was less successful, however, in shaping the regional
security order, although experts recognized the incremental improvements in
what would be a gradual process in minimizing the dominance of U.S. regional
alliances. Around 2005, Chinese experts noted increased resistance to China’s
preferred vision for regionalism and regional economic cooperation. To support
this assessment, this article reviews many Chinese-language articles and books
from government think-tank experts and scholars, supplemented with inter-
views with Chinese experts, official Chinese policy statements, and English-
language articles from Chinese experts.1
This article proceeds as follows. The first section examines the areas of Chi-
na’s success in shaping regional order and increasing China’s influence in the
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region. It addresses the areas of economics, security, East Asian regionalism,
and managing overall relations. The next section analyzes the limits of China’s
influence and the emerging resistance to China’s efforts to reshape regional
order. It covers East Asian regionalism, economics, and security. Last, I con-
clude by highlighting some analytical themes that point to current and future
challenges for China in increasing its regional influence.
Areas of Success in Developing and Exerting Regional Influence
Most Chinese experts agree that China’s improved regional strategy has
increased China’s overall influence in the region. After summarizing how Chi-
na’s approach has led to closer cooperation with its neighbors, Zhang (2013a, p.
75), former director of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) Institute
of Asia-Pacific Studies suggested: “in the middle of this transition, China has
much greater initiative and influence in its peripheral relations and environ-
ment.” Most other government think tank experts and scholars in China’s rela-
tions with its neighbors share this assessment. Several Chinese experts also
repeat a claim, attributed to a senior Singaporean diplomat, that the balance of
power in Asia had not changed, but the balance of influence in Asia was shift-
ing in China’s favor (Chen & Guan, 2014; Pang, 2004). The rest of this section
will examine China’s increasing influence in the areas of economics, security,
East Asian regionalism, and managing overall relations with neighbors.
Economics
Chinese experts argue that the dramatic increase in trade and investment
flows with its neighbors have led to a fundamental change in their relations
and have become an important source of international influence. Chinese schol-
ars routinely cite data that China has become the most important trade partner
and export market for most of its neighbors, including most U.S. allies. They
argue that China has become the main source of economic growth for the
region and countries increasingly rely on China economically, even as they con-
tinue to rely on the United States for security (Liu, 2011; Sun & Huang, 2011;
Zhou, 2012). Although Chinese experts are rarely clear and concrete about how
and through what exact mechanisms, most suggest that this growing economic
dependence on China increases its international influence and influence over
its regional neighbors. Two scholars from Tsinghua University note generally
that as a result of closer economic links, “China’s influence in its peripheral
region markedly increased” (Chen & Guan, p. 5). Some Chinese interlocutors
refer to the possibility of manipulating this interdependence, if needed, to
threaten or coerce neighbors, whereas others make the broader argument that
such dependence on China will convince its neighbors to adopt policies more
in line with China’s preferences (Interviews, Shanghai, Summer, 2006; Inter-
views, Beijing, Spring, 2009, Summer, 2014.) Interlocutors also note that these
changed bilateral economic interactions are also reshaping the regional eco-
nomic order in East Asia, making China the center of regional production and
trade networks (Interviews, Beijing Spring-Summer, 2006, Spring, 2009).
China improved its image in the late 1990s, especially with its decision not to
further devalue its currency during the Asian financial crisis, but its effective
influence in shaping regional economic cooperation did not really emerge until
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early in the new century. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
countries were very concerned that after China’s accession to the World Trade
Organization it would become a greater economic challenge and divert invest-
ment and trade away from Southeast Asia. In 1999, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji
tried to assuage these concerns at regional summits and in 2000, Zhu formally
proposed a China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). There was a strong
political component to this initiative as well, as China made concessions to reas-
sure neighbors such as excluding many sensitive sectors, allowing developing
countries to liberalize at a later date, and reaching “early harvest” agreements
that included trade liberalization favorable to the ASEAN countries. In addition
to the political benefits of CAFTA, it would strengthen economic linkages
between China and Southeast Asia and demonstrate the benefits to the region
of a rising China.
Chinese experts observe that promoting CAFTA had an even greater influ-
ence in reshaping trade cooperation and the regional order in East Asia accord-
ing to China’s preferences. In his assessment of regional cooperation, then-Vice
Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who was in charge of Asian affairs, suggested:
“China taking the lead in establishing an FTA with ASEAN drove other coun-
tries to adopt a more positive attitude towards free trade arrangements” (Wang
Y., 2004, p. 20). Zhang Yunling, who was a member of the experts group that
conducted the CAFTA feasibility study, noted that after China proposed the
FTA with ASEAN, FTAs became a “hot topic” in the region, and CAFTA
encouraged Japan, South Korea, and others to develop their own ASEAN1 1
FTAs (Zhang, 2011, p. 7). China became a “catalyst” (cuihuaji) and the construc-
tion of CAFTA “triggered an upsurge in regional FTAs” as Japan and South
Korea both “tried hard to catch up” (yingtouganshang) in exploring FTAs and
deepening economic cooperation with the ASEAN countries (Yang, Xi, &
Shang, 2002, p. 20). Zhang Yunling also argued that China’s active economic
efforts “forcefully promoted East Asian cooperation. Under the encouragement
of China constructing an FTA, Japan and South Korea both actively promoted
establishing an FTA with ASEAN” (Zhang, 2013b, p. 88).
After China’s efforts stimulated and inspired others to form FTAs with
ASEAN, further lowering regional trade barriers, Chinese leaders also led the
effort to reshape the regional economic order by integrating these FTAs into a
regional arrangement. Establishment of an East Asian Free Trade Area
(EAFTA) was an objective listed in the 2001 East Asia Vision Group (EAVG)
report, but Chinese leaders took the lead in proposing and promoting it. After
some discussions in earlier years, in 2004 Premier Wen Jiabao formally pro-
posed that these ASEAN1 1 FTAs should be integrated into an EAFTA. Chi-
na’s preferred vision was that this EAFTA should initially only include the
ASEAN plus Three (APT) countries as the foundation, and then could eventual-
ly expand to include others. Although Japan showed some discomfort with the
China-led initiative, the APT members agreed to establish a Joint Experts
Group to conduct feasibility studies, which was to be chaired by CASS’ Zhang
Yunling. Initial regional support for exploring this EAFTA showed that China
had not only improved its relations with ASEAN, but was also able to influence
the direction of regional integration toward its preferred vision of East Asian
integration as opposed to Asia-Pacific integration (Men, 2008, p. 77; Zhang &
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Zhou, 2003, pp. 10–14). According to Chinese experts, this was both the “ideal”
regional framework for China, and the one that would allow it to “maximize its
influence in the region” (Interviews, Beijing, Spring-Summer, 2006). As regional
cooperation and efforts to build an East Asian Community would likely draw
on the success of EAFTA, this forward momentum also made it more likely that
China could successfully shape the regional political and security order based
on APT as the foundation, which would more reflect China’s interests and give
it a greater ability to exert influence (Gu, 2005, pp. 1–11; Zhang, 2011, pp. 7–8).
Chinese experts recognize that China played a much larger role in shaping
relations in trade than in finance, but they note that China played an important
role in promoting regional financial cooperation. During the Asian financial cri-
sis, especially after the proposed Asian Monetary Fund was abandoned, Japan
played a much greater role in providing financial assistance to the region. The
Asian financial crisis spurred closer economic cooperation, especially through
the establishment of the APT mechanism. In 2000, APT finance ministers
reached an agreement on regional bilateral currency swaps that could be used
in a future crisis. Chinese experts recognize that Japan was the driving force for
the financial cooperation that became known as the Chiang Mai Initiative, but
they emphasized that Premier Zhu was very involved in the negotiations and
Chinese support played an important role in expanding regional economic
cooperation and furthered support for the APT process (Wang, 2010, p. 75).
Security
Although less successful in the security realm than in economics, China
achieved some progress in strengthening momentum for multilateral security
cooperation, exploring new areas of cooperation, and gradually reducing the
dominance of the U.S. alliance system. Chinese leaders oppose U.S. alliances in
Asia because they consider such alliances to be exclusive, aimed at specific
countries (including China), too focused on military threats, and a major threat
to regional stability. In 1996–1997, Chinese leaders proposed that countries
should abandon the “Cold War mentality” and instead adopt a model of coop-
erative security China called the New Security Concept (NSC). Rather than
strengthening exclusive alliances, Chinese leaders urged countries to form
“strategic partnerships” that would not threaten third parties, and it became
“strategic partners” with most of its neighbors. Chinese experts recognized that
support for an NSC would only emerge gradually, but the vision was that an
emphasis on dialogue, confidence-building measures (CBMs), and cooperation
in areas of shared interest would shape a regional security environment that
ensured the security of all countries and would also make it easier to manage
areas of tension and dispute.
China was most successful in shaping security relations with Central Asia,
and to some extent through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In the mid-
1990s, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan reached bilateral
and multilateral agreements on military CBMs, mutual reduction of military
forces, as well as limitations and notification for military exercises carried out
near shared borders. These initial agreements were further expanded with the
establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001, includ-
ing the addition of Uzbekistan, through which the members deepened
36 Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 9, Issue 1—2017
cooperation against threats from terrorism, separatism, and religious extrem-
ism, and continued military exchanges to build trust and confidence. Chinese
experts often characterized security cooperation in Central Asia and in the SCO
as a perfect model of the NSC in practice. It is an example of security coopera-
tion that is a partnership and not an alliance, and one that gradually deepened
through CBMs and dialogues (Yuan, 2010; Zhao, 2012).
China’s active participation in ARF and other regional institutions was aimed
at reassuring the region that China was not a threat, as well as trying to gradu-
ally build a more inclusive and cooperative regional security order. According
to many Chinese experts, participation in ARF helped countries build confi-
dence and trust in each other through dialogue, military CBMs, and military
exchanges. The preferred vision is to develop cooperation in less sensitive areas
of mutual threats, such as nontraditional security, and gradually expand into
more sensitive areas of traditional security. Experts recognized that this will be
a long and gradual process, but they point to expanding cooperation through
these institutions and increasing support for common security and an inclusive
regional order as developments that are favorable to China (Ding, 1998; Zhou
S., 2011).
Experts point to a few areas in the security realm in which China has been
especially successful in exerting influence and shaping the regional order. In
2003, China became the first non-ASEAN country to accede to ASEAN’s Treaty
of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). This political commitment is said to have
demonstrated China’s peaceful intentions and improved relations with the
ASEAN countries. In terms of shaping the regional order, similar to the regional
response to CAFTA, the other powers in East Asia followed suit in signing
TAC, which greatly improved the overall security situation in East Asia (Ruan,
2007, p. 307).
Chinese officials and experts emphasize China’s role in driving cooperation
in nontraditional security among East Asian countries and strengthening the
role of APT in dealing with political and security issues. According to then-
Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi, “China, taking the lead in proposing the devel-
opment of nontraditional security cooperation, expanded the scope and content
of East Asian cooperation” (Ruan, 2007, p. 307; Wang J., 2004, p. 20). Other
experts emphasize that China was successful in expanding cooperation through
the APT mechanism to also include political and security issues, starting with
nontraditional security. At the 2001 APT summit, Premier Zhu Rongji proposed
greater cooperation on issues such as terrorism, drug trafficking, and illegal
immigration. Although such nontraditional security cooperation also occurred
in institutions involving the United States, China was successful in expanding
the APT agenda to build trust and deepen cooperation on security issues with-
out the United States (Hu, 2002; Wu, 2012, p. 100).
Although continuing to emphasize its limited influence over North Korea,
Chinese experts point to its positive role in helping to manage the nuclear crisis
and promoting multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia. Although
reluctant at first, China used its influence and leverage to bring the powers
together, first through tripartite talks in 2003 and then through multiple rounds
of the Six-Party Talks. China played a role in persuading and pressuring North
Korea to participate in talks, and played an active role in setting the agenda,
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serving as a mediator, and forging consensus between all sides. The joint state-
ments in 2005 and 2007 seemed to successfully manage the problem and slowly
move North Korea in the direction of denuclearization and Northeast Asia
toward greater stability (Wang, 2012a). The 2007 joint statement supported the
establishment of a “Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism Working
Group.” Chinese experts were hopeful that such positive developments in mul-
tilateral security cooperation would lead to a more inclusive regional order
with a diminished role for alliances, which is exactly what China had been
advocating (Wang, 2012b).
East Asian Regionalism
China demonstrated its regional influence by shaping East Asian regional-
ism through its successful efforts to promote regional cooperation with the
APT members and mechanism as the foundation. Although other powers
were more responsible for establishing the APT mechanism during and
after the Asian financial crisis, as APT developed and expanded, China
grew more active in promoting APT cooperation. In the words of one CASS
researcher, APT was viewed as “a more favorable framework for coopera-
tion.” China realized that, as opposed to larger institutions involving the
United States and other nonregional countries, China would have more bar-
gaining power in smaller regional groupings like APT and it would put
China in a “more favorable position for raising agenda items and establish-
ing rules” (Wang, 2010, p. 87).
At the 2005 APT summit, which also marked the establishment of the East
Asia Summit (EAS), the communique declared that APT would be the “main
vehicle” for promoting regional cooperation and forming the East Asian Com-
munity. China actively lobbied ASEAN and was successful in driving East
Asian cooperation to continue to be centered on the APT process which both
reflected China’s preferences and would give China more influence over the
process going forward. China’s preferred vision of regionalism was “open,”
but it preferred to start from the APT members, and then eventually expand to
potentially include other countries. Similar to the experience with the EAFTA,
Chinese leaders and experts were especially satisfied that East Asian countries
supported an East Asian vision for regional cooperation, as opposed to a trans-
Pacific or Asia-Pacific vision, and planned to deepen political cooperation and
build an East Asian Community including the 13 APT countries (Mei, 2010).
Chinese experts also point to China’s desire to strengthen its “agenda-
setting”power (yicheng shezhi) and its ability to influence the “rules of the game”
(youxi guize) in international and regional institutions (Kuik, 2005; Ruan, 2007,
p. 289). China was successful in promoting the APT membership and mecha-
nism as the foundation of East Asian regional cooperation, but it was also inter-
ested in shaping the content of discussion at these regional summits. Although
China’s restraint and cooperative policies made this easier, China was also able
to keep territorial disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea off formal
agendas of regional institutions and there was minimal discussion of these
issues in these venues. Regional summits rarely included criticism and pressure
on China on human rights or domestic political issues, but China and many of
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the ASEAN countries had a common position in trying to keep interference in
domestic affairs off of the agenda and out of the discussion (Wu, 2009, p. 57).
Managing Overall Relations with the Region
In the first two decades after the end of the Cold War, China was relatively
successful in managing relations with its neighbors, as Chinese experts empha-
sized that none of its neighbors had adopted a fundamentally hostile or adver-
sarial policy toward China, even as its power increased. China was not really
successful in weakening U.S. alliances in the region, but it was quite successful
in preventing the formation of an anti-China balancing coalition. A generally
stable international environment minimized the external pressure on China
and allowed the leadership to focus more of its effort and resources on address-
ing the immense domestic political and economic challenges facing China.
Although general concerns about China remained, and there were specific
areas of tension with certain neighbors, Chinese experts observed that deepen-
ing cooperation with China had become the consensus of all of its neighbors.
According to the conclusions of one comprehensive CASS study on the China
policy of its neighbors, “the vast majority of countries in the region have chosen
friendly coexistence with China” (Tang, Zhang, & Cao, 2005, p. 6). All countries
in the study had chosen policies of engagement or cooperation toward China,
and none had opted for confrontation. Another thorough study of the percep-
tions of periphery countries argued that no countries had defined their relations
with China as “competitive adversaries” and most had either defined them as
“cooperative partners” or a mix of cooperation and competition (Qian, 2010).
According to Wang Jisi (2004, p. 16), dean of Peking University’s School of
International Studies, “Most Chinese policy advisors. . ..point to greatly
improved bilateral ties with China’s neighbors, contending that few, if any,
Asian powers would join a U.S.-led coalition to contain China.”
Chinese experts observed that no country had defined China as an enemy or
adversary, no “Asian NATO” or anti-China balancing coalition had emerged,
and neighbors rarely challenged Chinese interests. By the mid-2000s, China’s
strategy of reassurance and shaping regional perceptions helped lead to dra-
matic improvements in relations with Southeast Asia, Russia, Central Asia,
South Korea, and even India. For relations with more problems and tension,
such as Sino-Japanese relations, Chinese experts noted that these countries
adopted hedging strategies as opposed to undertaking adversarial balancing
and containment actions. Although concerns and issues remained in many rela-
tionships, the possibility of China as an opportunity helped shape the regional
environment in a more positive direction (Zhou, 2010, p. 47).
Limits and Resistance to Chinese Influence
There were many areas in which China exerted influence over its neighbors
and shaped regional order during this period, but China also faced consider-
able resistance from Japan, ASEAN, and the United States. This resistance dem-
onstrated the limits of China’s ability to shape regional order, and the
challenges China faced in gaining support for its preferred vision of regional
order. This section will examine the limits of and resistance to China’s influence
in the areas of East Asian regionalism, economics, and security.
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East Asian Regionalism
China’s preferred vision of regional cooperation included only East Asian
countries as the foundation, with the possibility of gradually expanding and
drawing in other countries. Chinese experts argued that a regional cooperation
process that started with the 13 countries of APT and then expanded would
produce greater cooperation and more efficient results, and would also provide
China with more influence and bargaining power (Wang, 2010, p. 87; Yang,
Dao, Lin, Liu, & Yang, 2005). Contrary to China’s preferences, Japan and sever-
al Southeast Asian countries agreed in 2005 that the EAS would be dominated
by ASEAN and expand its membership to include non-APT countries. China’s
preferred vision of APT-centered regionalism seemed to have support, but oth-
er regional countries increased their resistance to this vision and supported a
broader vision for regional cooperation. This expanded EAS and broader vision
for regionalism served to limit and dilute China’s influence, and from China’s
perspective, distorted the process of East Asian cooperation.
As discussed earlier, the regional cooperation that emerged after the Asian
financial crisis seemed to be moving in China’s preferred direction, with the
endorsement of APT as the “main vehicle” for achieving an East Asian Com-
munity and support for an EAFTA with APT members. When the EAS was ini-
tially proposed, China expected it to only include the 13 countries of APT and
continue to be an “Asian mechanism” (Ren, 2008, p. 17). Experts noted that the
2001 EAVG recommended the evolution of the APT leaders’ meeting into the
EAS. As a result, Chinese experts not only expected that the EAS would include
the APT members, but also hoped that the 13 countries would participate as
“equal individual members.” Rather than continuing to be the “guest of the
group of lesser states,” as they were in the APT summits, China wanted and
expected that the three Northeast Asian countries would be able to host EAS
summits. According to two experts on Asian regionalism at the Chinese For-
eign Affairs University, a more equal arrangement that allowed China to host
summits would enable it to “take part in agenda-setting and norm developing
as a major power” (Qin & Wei, 2008, p. 134). China cautiously offered to host
the first EAS, and when it was determined that Malaysia would host the first
summit in 2005, China offered to host the second one (Ren, 2009, p. 312). Chi-
nese leaders and experts were optimistic that the establishment of the EAS
would mark the next step in deepening regional cooperation along the narrow
lines China preferred, and would provide China with an opportunity to have
even greater voice and exert more influence over regional dynamics.
When ASEAN announced the membership criteria and arrangements for the
EAS, they fell far short of China’s hopes, expectations, and desires. These crite-
ria enabled non-APT countries to participate, and India, Australia, and New
Zealand met the criteria and participated in the first EAS. ASEAN also decided
that instead of the members being equal and allowing all members to host the
summit on a rotating basis, the EAS would be dominated by ASEAN and only
ASEAN members could serve as host and set the agenda for meetings.
According to Fudan University Professor Ren (2009, pp. 312–13), “the mem-
bership idea that ASEAN outlined differed from what China assumed or
desired” and bringing in non-East Asian countries “was not what Beijing
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would like to see.” In response, China proposed a two-tier structure of
“APT1 3,” in which APT would be the core and the other non-East Asian coun-
tries would be the periphery, ensuring that “the newly admitted three would
have less influence” (Qin & Wei, 2008, p. 135). ASEAN did not endorse this pro-
posal, so China’s status in the EAS would not be equal to ASEAN members,
and it would even have the same lower status as other non-East Asian countries
like Australia and India.
Chinese experts were happy that APT would be the main vehicle for the pro-
motion of an East Asian Community, but the establishment of EAS had blocked
China’s preferred direction of regional cooperation and demonstrated consider-
able resistance to China’s ability to shape the region. According to one scholar,
Beijing felt “frustrated” that non-East Asian countries were invited to partici-
pate and “what dismayed it even more was the decision that the EAS would be
hosted only by ASEAN countries, thus not including China” (Wu, 2009, p. 60).
Hoping that the EAS would deepen cooperation between the APT countries,
one Chinese expert on regionalism suggests that including the other countries
marked “a step away from (tuoli) the objective of the summit” (Ren, 2008, p.
17). Another scholar argues that the EAS was challenged by “great power inter-
ference” and it became a “non-East Asian” meeting that had “lost the original
meaning for convening the summit” (Pang, 2012, p. 67).
Chinese experts mostly blamed Japan and the United States for obstructing
the progress of East Asian cooperation. They argued that rather than continuing
the healthy development of APT cooperation, Japan pressured ASEAN to pull
in outsiders to contain China, constrain its influence, prevent the emergence of
China-centered regionalism, and seize the initiative in the competition for
regional leadership. Others argue that when the United States saw the progress
of APT regional cooperation as a challenge to its interests, it pressured Japan,
South Korea, and ASEAN to bring in other members to balance China and pre-
vent Chinese domination (Ren, 2008, p. 17; Zhou, 2014, p. 14).
Although Japan and the United States were the convenient scapegoats, and
some resistance to Chinese initiatives was expected, Chinese interlocutors
revealed that some concerns among ASEAN countries were an important factor
behind the expansion of the EAS. These concerns among ASEAN countries,
moreover, might present new challenges to China’s desires to shape the direc-
tion of regionalism. Beijing was especially disappointed in the form that EAS
took because it had very active lobbied ASEAN to support its vision of equal
participation by East Asian countries. Japan had also lobbied ASEAN for an
enlarged EAS, and at least Singapore and Indonesia supported this vision.
Some ASEAN states worried that China was becoming too powerful and sup-
ported an enlarged EAS to prevent Chinese domination of the region. Another
concern among ASEAN states, which would become more prominent over time
among Chinese experts, was that regional cooperation with all APT members
as equals would undermine “ASEAN centrality” and force ASEAN to cede
influence to Northeast Asia. Chinese leaders and experts openly supported
“ASEAN centrality” in regional institutions to avoid being perceived as a
threat, even as more experts noted how unnatural it was to have the weaker
powers of ASEAN driving cooperation and setting the agenda. Especially after
the 2003 ASEAN summit in Bali, Chinese experts also increasingly observed
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that the ASEAN countries seemed more interested in developing and strength-
ening the ASEAN Community and less interested in an East Asian Community
(Pang, 2012, p. 67; Zhai, 2009).
The establishment of an expanded EAS demonstrated resistance in Japan and
ASEAN to China’s preferred direction of regional cooperation and constrained
China’s ability to shape East Asian regionalism. In response to the expanded
EAS, especially as it was designed as the supplement to APT as the “main vehi-
cle” for establishing an EAC, China tried to minimize the importance of EAS
and put more emphasis on APT and other regional institutions. However, even
though earlier support had generated momentum for deepening APT-centered
regional cooperation, the resistance that emerged to this vision significantly
delayed progress in East Asian regionalism. According to Renmin University
Professor Pang (2011, p. 52), “In recent years, leaders from both Southeast Asia
and Northeast Asia decreasingly talked about the future of ‘ASEAN1 3’ as the
base of EAC. Since 2005, the East Asia Summit (EAS) has made EAC more
impossible rather than possible.”
Economics
China’s preferred form of regional FTA, an EAFTA involving the APT coun-
tries, also met resistance when Japan and the United States both proposed com-
peting regional FTA frameworks that gained some support in the region.
Although feasibility studies for the narrow EAFTA had already started, Japan
proposed a different vision for a regional FTA in 2006. The Japan-led FTA,
called the Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA), differed
from the EAFTA in both membership and content. Drawing on the example of
an enlarged EAS, Japan argued that there would be greater economic gains
from a larger FTA and proposed that the CEPEA also include Australia, New
Zealand, and India. Whereas the EAFTA was a “low-quality” FTA, only cover-
ing trade and allowing many carve-outs to protect sensitive sectors, the CEPEA
was a broader economic agreement that also covered investment, environment,
energy, and institutions. When a similar CEPEA Joint Experts Group was estab-
lished to conduct feasibility studies, China was disappointed that these two
competing visions were both supported and seemingly accorded equal status
to develop along parallel tracks.
Although they remained hopeful that the EAFTA would be implemented,
Chinese experts objected to an enlarged membership which would reduce Chi-
na’s bargaining advantages and influence and were concerned that a more com-
prehensive approach would put pressure on China to implement domestic
reforms sooner than they were ready. Japan made an economic argument for
the CEPEA, but Chinese experts emphasized Japan’s political motivations and
its desire to contain China’s influence and prevent its leadership in regional
affairs. According to CASS’ Zhang Yunling, who was the chair of the EAFTA
Joint Experts Group and a member of the CEPEA Joint Experts Group, “the dif-
ferences in FTA integration emerged, at its root, from the political differences
over establishing East Asian cooperation mechanisms” (Tang & Wang, 2014;
Zhang, 2011, p. 8). In a thorough analysis of the different mechanisms for
regional cooperation, another scholar argues that Japan did not think it could
balance China by itself, so it has tried to pull other non-East Asian powers into
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regional cooperation arrangements to balance China’s influence (Su, 2008,
p. 33).
As these regional FTAs were developing, the United States also proposed its
preferred vision of a regional FTA. The United States proposed a Free Trade
Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), which would cover all 21 economies of the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and, therefore, produce much
greater economic gains. As trade liberalization through APEC had slowed
based on earlier disagreements and regional FTAs became more popular after
the Asian financial crisis, this was also an attempt to revitalize APEC. At the
2006 APEC summit, the members agreed to explore the possible creation of a
broader FTAAP, and feasibility studies followed.
Chinese experts remained open to this broader approach, but raised many
concerns. They argued that it would be too difficult to reach agreement with so
many economies at different levels of development, and suggested that the Chi-
nese approach of starting from APT and gradually expanding to include other
countries would be easier to achieve. Similar to concerns about the Japan-led
CEPEA, Chinese experts worried that it would force China to reform domestic
sectors before they were prepared, especially in terms of opening to investment,
which could produce political and social instability. The FTAAP would also
include Taiwan, and China preferred a vision for regional cooperation that
excluded Taiwan and reduced its international space. Chinese scholars noted
that the United States had an economic motivation and did want to be excluded
from the economic gains of liberalization (Sheng, 2007). But experts put more
emphasis on political factors and argued that the United States was unhappy
with the development of East Asian cooperation, and needed to interfere to
ensure its dominant position in the region and to constrain Chinese regional
influence (Zhai, 2009, p. 14). These American and Japan-led FTA initiatives,
and regional support for them, complicated China’s preferred vision for eco-
nomic cooperation and slowed the momentum for APT-led integration over
which China would have greater influence.
Security
In regional security affairs, China expanded bilateral and multilateral securi-
ty regional cooperation, but the United States further strengthened its regional
alliances during this period and even developed security cooperation with new
regional partners. Although Chinese experts try to suggest that the NSC was
not an attack on U.S. alliances and was not an attempt to force the United States
out of the region, they recognize that more aggressive lobbying by defense offi-
cials in the late 1990s was not well-received by countries in East Asia (Inter-
views, Beijing, Summer, 2006; Interviews, Shanghai, Fall, 2009).
If China hoped that its reassurance efforts and support for multilateral securi-
ty cooperation would weaken American alliances in the region, these hopes
were dashed. In the mid-to-late 1990s, the United States strengthened and rede-
fined its alliances with Japan and Australia, reached a Visiting Forces Agree-
ment with the Philippines, and reached new military agreements with security
partners like Singapore (Ma, 2000). After the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the Unit-
ed States strengthened anti-terror and nonproliferation cooperation with all of
its allies and several countries in Southeast Asia, expanded the APEC agenda to
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also include security issues, and rather than moving out of the region, the U.S.
military moved into bases in Central Asia on China’s borders in support of the
war in Afghanistan.
Chinese experts observed that under the Bush administration, the United
States strengthened its alliance with Japan, and it appeared even more con-
cerned with China. In 2005, the United States and Japan not only issued a joint
statement that mentioned Taiwan as an area of concern, but also held a military
exercise in defense of a small Japanese island, with China as the undeclared
opponent. The United States expanded its military exercises with regional part-
ners and invited additional parties to participate, which enhanced multilateral
cooperation and coordination. Although multilateral regional security coopera-
tion progressed, new multilateral security arrangements also emerged, includ-
ing groupings such as U.S.-Japan-South Korea, U.S.-Japan-Australia, and the
short-lived U.S.-Japan-Australia-India quad. In addition to expanding coopera-
tion with traditional allies, the United States developed new security coopera-
tion with India through civilian nuclear assistance and a new defense
agreement (Sun, 2011). During this period, no countries in the region defined
China as an enemy or adversary, but the continued strength of U.S. alliances
and security partners severely limited China’s influence in regional security
affairs. China was successful in reassuring others that it was not a threat, but it
achieved little success in weakening U.S. alliances or cooperation with regional
partners.
Conclusion: Analytical Themes and Challenges
for China’s Effort to Expand Influence
The main finding of this article is that Chinese experts’ perception of China’s
efforts before the financial crisis to reshape the regional order and exert influence
in East Asia achieved mixed success. China was especially successful in prevent-
ing others from adopting hostile anti-China balancing postures, and before 2005,
successful in attaining support and momentum for its preferred vision of East
Asian regional cooperation and regional trade liberalization. China was less suc-
cessful, however, in shaping the regional security order, although experts recog-
nized the incremental improvements in what would be a gradual process in
minimizing the dominance of U.S. regional alliances. Around 2005, however,
Chinese experts noted increased resistance to China’s preferred vision for region-
alism and regional economic cooperation. Although a comparison of Chinese
assessments and international assessments is beyond the scope of this article, the
main contribution has been to introduce these perceptions and assessments in
the Chinese-language sources. Further research can and should examine the
areas of agreement and divergence between Chinese, Asian, and Western assess-
ments and attempt to explain the areas of divergence.
Chinese observations and analysis of this earlier “charm offensive” reveal
several themes with implications for China’s ability to successfully wield and
increase its influence in the region. These analytical themes highlight conditions
that enabled successful exercise of influence and shaping of regional order, as
well as factors that have presented challenges and constraints on the exercise of
influence and have become more prominent as China’s rise continues.
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First, although U.S. officials and many U.S. experts would disagree with this
characterization, Chinese experts point to the low levels of American attention
and focus on East Asia as a key factor that helped China build influence in the
region and drive regional cooperation in its preferred direction. Experts point
to the slow American response to the Asian financial crisis and focus on terror-
ism and the Middle East as part of the global war on terror after 9/11. Although
the United States deepened security cooperation with several of its East Asian
allies and partners, Chinese experts argue that the United States was not very
interested in or involved in regional cooperation or regional institutions. They
cite Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s skipping the ARF summit in 2005
and 2007 and note that when American officials participated in regional meet-
ings, they usually focused on terrorism and security, and spent little time dis-
cussing economic cooperation and economic benefits.
According to one CASS scholar, “since the 1990s, the U.S. neglected (hushi)
Asia-Pacific regional cooperation policies for a long time” and its “passive” atti-
tude toward the region, except for issues of terrorism, helped China deepen
cooperation with its neighbors (Zhou F., 2011, p. 69). Zhang (2013a, p. 78)
argues that “without U.S. participation, regional relations had a great transfor-
mation, regional cooperation had great success, including an enormous
increase in China’s power and influence as a prominent change.” As U.S.
neglect of regional affairs and regional cooperation greatly assisted China in
increasing its regional influence, the Obama administration’s increased empha-
sis on the region as part of the “rebalance” has presented a new challenge for
China’s efforts to shape the region according to its preferences.
Second, even before the shift in U.S. policy in the region that has become known
as the “rebalance” or “pivot,” China was already beginning to face resistance to its
regional vision and Chinese experts noted that China may be reaching its limits in
terms of China’s preferred path for regional cooperation. China’s neighbors were
excited and reassured that China was deepening its engagement with the region
through bilateral cooperation and participation in multilateral institutions. Espe-
cially with the Asian financial crisis having strengthened the need for narrow East
Asian cooperation, China’s neighbors responded to its initiatives (such as propos-
ing CAFTA, promoting APT-centered regionalism, and acceding to TAC) in ways
that strengthened China’s preferred path to regionalism. Around 2004–2005, how-
ever, rather than Chinese actions and success serving as the “catalyst” to push its
neighbors to take actions supporting its vision, they began to respond in ways that
resisted and complicated China’s preferred vision for regional cooperation. Japan
and several ASEAN countries proposed and supported broader regional FTAs,
expanded regional institutions such as the EAS to draw in external powers, and
grew increasingly concerned about Chinese domination of regional order. Many
Chinese analysts were beginning to see the new challenges in further deepening
regional cooperation and would likely agree broadly with Rozman’s (2010, p. 221)
suggestion that “by 2009 the limits of China’s approach to regionalism were
unmistakable.” As this resistance to narrow regionalism developed, even though
China continued to promote deepening cooperation through the APT process,
after the global financial crisis, China was forced to shift from supporting its
“ideal” frameworks for regional cooperation to supporting those that were the
“least bad,” but a long way from its preferred vision for regional cooperation.
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The third theme is the tension between China’s reassurance approach and
its ability to shape the region. As part of China’s reassurance efforts, it must
support “ASEAN centrality” in regional institutions to communicate its
restraint and cooperative spirit. As many Chinese experts noted during this
period, if China is “too active” in its involvement in regional affairs and
attempts to shape regional agendas, it will be perceived as overbearing,
threatening, and trying to challenge the United States in East Asia by creating
its own sphere of influence under Chinese dominance. However, this reassur-
ance approach also limits the degree to which China can shape the regional
order and agenda of regional institutions, and limits the degree to which it
can make demands on its neighbors and exert its influence (Ruan, 2007, p.
318). Zhao (2011, pp. 64–67) notes that what he calls China’s “soft approach”
to regional cooperation is effective in many areas such as defending sover-
eignty, but also limits the degree to which China can influence regional
dynamics. This tension continues to be a challenge for China’s approach to its
neighbors. As it has maintained strong economic growth during and after the
global financial crisis, the power gap between China and the ASEAN coun-
tries has expanded even more dramatically, and it has become even more
“unnatural” to Chinese experts to have ASEAN dominate the regional agen-
da. This has led to a policy challenge in China of trying to be more active in
shaping its relations with its neighbors and the region, but trying to avoid
being seen as too active or too threatening.
The fourth theme, which has also become more prominent, is that China has
been successful in improving relations with its neighbors, but has not been able
to develop many close relations or dependable security partners in the region.
According to CASS’ Zhou (2010, p. 47), the attitude toward China among coun-
tries in its periphery had transformed from “fearful” and “not willing to
accept” to “fundamentally acceptable” and from “not like” to “no dislike or
antipathy.” This is an important success for China, but Zhou (2010, p. 47) notes
that this transition is relatively easy, and the next stage from “no antipathy” to
“like” is much more difficult. He notes that China has been successful in reduc-
ing the number of countries that are balancing against China, but has not had
much success in making its neighbors be willing to “follow” (zhuisui) or band-
wagon with China. Although China has improved its relations with many of its
neighbors, with the possible exception of Pakistan, none of them would support
China reliably and unconditionally. As a result of this continued weakness in
security affairs, some Chinese scholars have proposed more active efforts to
develop deeper security relations with “strategic fulcrum” (zhanl€ue zhidian)
countries or “quasi-allies” to make up for China’s shortcomings in regional
security affairs (Hu, 2014). Yan Xuetong, the director of the Institute of Interna-
tional Relations at Tsinghua University, has gone so far as to call for abandon-
ing China’s long-standing official policy of nonalignment, arguing that forming
alliances and providing security guarantees is the only way to improve China’s
weak position in regional security affairs (Yan, 2013).
Note
1The procedure for selecting Chinese sources was as follows. I used the China Academic Journals
database from the widely available China Knowledge Resource Integrated Database, or CNKI. I
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searched several of the main journals from government think tanks that include articles published by
think-tank researchers and academic scholars. These journals were: Dangdai Yatai, Xiandai Guoji
Guanxi, Guoji Wenti Yanjiu, Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi, Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (later Waijiao Pinglun),
Shijie Zhishi,Dongnanya Zongheng. For these journals, I used title and keyword searches of “East Asia”
(Dongya) and “periphery” (zhoubian) from 1994 to the present, to populate the list of most relevant
articles. I supplemented these articles with several Chinese-language books published by well-
known government think tank researchers and scholars who are experts on China’s relations with its
neighbors.
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